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We propose a methodology to develop trust in encrypted programs.  The goal of 
this research is to provide system administrators, users, and security personnel with the 
information necessary in order to safely execute encrypted programs on their systems 
without compromising their sensitive data.  Traditional monitoring techniques aim to 
observe program behavior and characteristics in order to detect potential security 
weaknesses.  However, there are many program encryption tech iques designed to defeat 
many of the current monitoring approaches.  Our goal is not to defeat the encryption of a 
program, but to inform the user if the encrypted program is behaving in a dangerous way.  
There is no such methodology available at present to perf rm this function. 
In our work, we present the results of implementing on demand system call 
monitoring, which uses a policy based and behavior based intrusion detection system to 
ensure that a program is not compromised or is accessing data in n unsafe manner.  We 
believe that implementing this layer minimizes the changes to the operating system thus 
lowers the probability of incompatibility with executing encrypted software.  Further, we 










 Encryption is increasingly being used as deterrence for software piracy and 
vulnerability exploitation.  Unencrypted or insecure programs can be the subject of 
intensive scrutiny by attackers in an attempt to disable protective features or to find 
buffer overflows as an avenue of attack of other system .  The application of encrypted 
programs, however, leads to other security concerns as user  are no longer able to 
distinguish between malicious and benign behavior due to the secretive nature of 
encryption.  Furthermore, should an attacker gain access to the software update process 
then malicious updates or modifications can be made to the system without the 
knowledge of the users.  Therefore, system administrators running encrypted software 
now have a need for techniques that would allow such encrypted software to execute 
properly while minimizing the possibility of the system being compromised.  The goal of 
this research is to develop a methodology that can enable users to trust encrypted 
software to allow their execution. 
1.1 Motivation 
 Although executable encryption techniques have been around since the 1980s 
[10], the generated encrypted executables were either too easy to decrypt or not 
mainstream applications.  This situation was changed in 2003 when Niklas Zennström 
and Janus Friis developed Skype, a peer-to-peer Voice-over-IP (VoIP) software [2].  This 
software employed many new and innovative encryption methods and it has the ability to 
bypass most firewalls by using an overlay network to transmit voice data.  Currently with 
over 150 million downloads and 50 million registered users, Skype is perhaps the most 
widely distributed encrypted software in the world.  This rapid growth, however, raise 
concerns from system administrators who fear that the software may be used as a 
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backdoor by attackers to gain access into the computers using convert channels 
embedded into the VoIP traffic.  Today, many techniques and methods have been 
developed for malicious software detection; however, they ar  not as effective against the 
polymorphic nature of encrypted programs such as Skype.  This presents a dilemma for 
system administrators as they must make the tradeoff b tween restricting certain software 
and potentially compromising system security.   
Currently, we are not aware of any program monitoring system available for 
observing and establishing trust in encrypted software.  The purpose of this research is to 
develop a methodology that would enable users to minimize their risk potential.  By 
doing so, we aim not to reverse-engineer encrypted software but to allow users to safely 
execute these programs while remaining secure with the knowledge that their sensitive 
information and data are being protected.  To do so, we mustexamine the program 
monitoring and encryption techniques as well as methods to safeguard systems from 
unknown software attacks. 
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 provides the background information on prior program monitoring 
approaches and definitions of some important concepts and terms.  Additionally, an 
overview of key related research is discussed.  Chapter 3 provides a survey of current 
program monitoring and encryption techniques.  Chapter 4 presents our methodology for 
monitoring encrypted programs and establishing trust.  Evaluations of our approach by 
testing a prototype against several types of programs and intrusions are presented in 






The continued battle between software vendors and piracy h s introduced new 
technology that reveals shortcomings of current security mechanisms and monitoring 
systems.  For instance, Apple has devised several measures such as encrypting some key 
applications to make it “non-trivial” to pirate Mac OS X [1].  Other notable software that 
employs extensive encryption techniques includes Skype [2] and program packers such 
as Burneye [3], EXECryptor [4], UPX [5], and Shiva [6].  The main motivations for 
program encryption are for the following reasons: 
• Illegal Distributing – One of the biggest concerns for the software industry is the 
loss of revenue due to the illegal distribution of proprietary software.  Companies 
can employ program encryption and only allow users with legal software keys. 
• Tampering – Illegal software vendors often modify the binary of the program to 
disable any checks for legality of the software.  By encrypting the program, the 
software companies can hinder such tampering. 
• Reverse-Engineering – Companies may not wish to show their proprietary code to 
rival companies, thus program encryption can be used to hinder reverse 
engineering attempts. 
• Security through Obscurity – Although controversial, it can be argued that 
program obfuscation makes it more difficult for attackers to detect exploitable 
program flaws such as buffer overflows. 
As a result, new program monitoring techniques must be explored to improve 
system security and to establish user trust for encrypted rograms.  These encrypted 
programs may be the favored target for attackers as they find these targets interested.  
Moreover, if they do manage to find vulnerabilities, it is possible for them to hide their 
activities due to the encryption.  Some possible motives for uch attacks include: 
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• Information Harvesting – An attacker may wish to obtain personal information 
about the user for identity theft.  This may include banking information, social 
security numbers, classified documents, and so on.  If the program is encrypted, 
the attacker’s actions may go unnoticed. 
• Resource Gathering – An attacker may want to use the resources of the system for 
illegal activity such as in denial of service attacks or for transmitting spam.  Once 
the encrypted software is compromised, the attacker can regain access to the 
system by installing an undetectable backdoor into the program. 
• Program Distribution – The attacker can use the encrypted program to infect other 
software on the system or other computers within the network.  If an encrypted 
software is brought into a company by an unwitting user, it can now access 
computers within the network and bypass company security measures uch as 
firewalls. 
Due to the difficulty of monitoring encrypted programs, we believe that new 
detecting methods must be investigated.  Such methods must obey sev ral important 
properties to be successful: 
• Program Invariability – Programs cannot be modified in any wa  or form as 
encrypted programs often have ways of detecting and rejecting inserted code.  
Also, it is uncertain how encrypted program will change its behavior or nature 
when modified. 
• Faultless Execution – The program must execute properly while be ng monitored.  
Program execution under monitoring must behave exactly the same if the program 
is not being monitored.  
• System Integrity – The integrity of the program monitoring system must remain 
intact and cannot be affected by the program being monitored.  Often, encrypted 
programs may contain code to defeat certain monitoring techniques.  Such 
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attempts must be detectable in order to know if the system integrity has been 
compromised. 
In this work, we focus on malicious behavior detection.  In particular, we explore 
the file system integrity and execution properties through the use of system call 
monitoring.  The section below is a list of terminology used in this research followed by a 
short system architecture overview and the role of system calls.  Finally, we conclude this 
chapter with a discussion of related work. 
2.1 Terms 
Black-Box Program – Any program that is obfuscated and can only be viewed in 
terms of its input and output characteristics can be categorized as a black-box program.  
Black-box programs may also have many countermeasures to defeat any attempts to 
obtain program instructions or program behavior information. 
Trust – Trust, as defined by Banerjee in [9] says that a software system is 
trustworthy if it encompasses security, reliability, availability, fault-tolerance, and 
survivability.  In [8], Trust is defined as the level at which a user believes a computer 
system executes as specifies and does nothing else.  For this research, we modify these 
two terms and define trust as the level at which a user believes a computer program 
executes as specified and does nothing else while providing covin ing security and 
reliability.figure 
Compromised Program – When an attacker has made some form of unauthorized 
access to a program, the program is said to be compromised.  If this compromise allows 
the attacker to implement a means into the system, then the attacker can gain root access 
to the entire system.  Other compromises may deal with information security; the attacker 




Instrumentation – Instrumentation is when direct modifications are performed to 
the system to achieve a specific purpose.  In this case, we instrument the kernel to enable 
system call monitoring.  Although there are many methods of providing the necessary 
system call monitoring information as discussed in section 2.3, we argue that 
instrumentation is necessary to defeat the anti revers-engineering techniques discussed 
in section 4. 
On Demand System Call Monitoring – On demand system call monitoring is a 
term for the ability to enable and disable system call monitoring as required.  The reason 
why it is undesirable to enable system call monitoring at all times is due to its overhead 
when dealing with particular system calls, such as those for reading from a file.  With on 
demand system call monitoring, the user can enable this feature when executing a black-
box program. 
2.2 Operating System Model 
Our model of the operating system is shown in Figure 1.  All processes must 
remain in user space and are isolated from each other and the kernel level resources, 




while any object inside the kernel space has direct access to all other resources as well as 
all user level processes.  As shown in this figure, in order to interact with the hardware 
and access kernel level resources, all processes must submit their request through the 
system call layer.  Due to this characteristic, it is possible for a monitoring program to 
examine the input and outputs as seen at the system call leve  in order to detect all 
changes made on the system by a process.  This, however, does not guarantee that once 
system wide access has been granted to a particular process, additional modifications can 
be detected. 
2.3 Related Work 
Program-monitoring and intrusion detection techniques have been studied for 
many years.  There are many methods and architectures for monitors and IDS systems.  
This section presents a survey of the current state of program monitoring, in particular, 
system call monitoring.  Monitoring system calls as opposed to monitoring machine 
instructions have several benefits, including less data to nalyze and less program 
execution performance penalty as compared to instruction level monitoring since system 
calls occur less frequently.  Finally, it is possible to filter on function call names or 
arguments. 
Forrest, Hofmeyr, Somayaji, and Longstaff in [15] created an “artificial immune 
system” for the UNIX operating system that may lead to aut matic intrusion detection.  
The assumption made in this paper is that short sequences of sy tem calls can be used to 
build a profile for the operating system to distinguish betwe n normal and abnormal 
behavior.  The method developed breaks down sequences of system calls into a database 
that can be easily accessed in linear time for comparisons.  For example, the system call 
sequence of execve, access, open, open, access, mmap, read, close is stored in a table 
format shown in Figure 2.  When comparing this table with the sequence of execve, open, 
open, access, open, open, access, close, the following mismatch errors are generated: 
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• Execve should not be followed by open at position 1 
• Execve should not befollowed by access at position 3 
• Open should not be followed by open at position 3 
• Open should not be followed by open at position 2 
• Open should not be followed by open at position 3 
• Open should not be followed by close at position 3. 
• Open should not be followed by close at position 2. 
• Access should not be followed by close at position 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Breakdown of sequences of system calls 
Forrest et al show that after approximately 3000 system calls, virtually no new 
patterns are encountered under normal conditions for their example program (sendmail).   
Their research also demonstrated that short sequences of system calls can be used to 
define a stable signature for the detection of some common anomalous behaviors.  Since 
this architecture has relatively modest computation and storage requirements, it can be 
implemented on an online system in which the kernel checks ach system call made by 
root processes. 
Hofmeyr, Forrest, and Somayaji continued their pervious work by introducing a 
method of intrusion detection based on patterns in sequences of system calls via anomaly 
detection [13].  The idea behind their research is to gather data on a running program to 
build a behavior profile for the executable.  The data stored in the profile is simply a 
  
 9 
database containing all unique sequences of system calls for a given length k.  Each 
program under observation is associated with a unique database.  Once a stable database 
is constructed, it can be used to monitor the ongoing behavior of the process.  The 
intrusion detection system reports the number of mismatches, percentage of mismatches, 
and normalized anomaly signal generated by program execution.  With this method of 
detection, Hofmeyr et al successfully detected several classes of abnormal behavior 
including: intrusions in the UNIX programs sendmail, lpr, and ftpd, failed intrusion 
attempts on sendmail, and error conditions in sendmail.  
Christina Warrender, Stephanie Forrest, and Barak Pearlmutter in [16] further 
examine Hofmeyr’s work in the previous work through additional performance analysis 
using a much larger and complete dataset.  The architecture described here is tested with 
three attacks: A denial-of-service attack for tying up network connection resources that 
contains a slightly modified daemon process but same startup and child processes, a 
second denial-of-service attack designed to tie up all system memory during intrusion 
monitoring, and a final data set with normal data designed for false positives analysis.  
Warrender et al used four different methods for modeling the normal behavior of the data 
sets: sequence time-delay embedding (STIDE), STIDE with frequency threshold (T-
STIDE), repeated incremental pruning to produce error (RIPPER), and Hidden Markov 
Models (HMMs).  This study shows that the amount of false negatives decreases as the 
window threshold increases, but the amount of false positive  also increases. 
Jae-Kook Lee and Hyong-Shik Kim proposed a Log-Based Intrusion Recovery 
Module (LBIRM) that utilizes system calls dealing with the file system to recover 
damaged or lost files due to intrusions [17].  The system proposed is a method of keeping 
the contents of designated files as a chain of logs.  Whenever a designated file is 
modified, a log will be automatically created to keep track of the changes.  The log file 
contains modifications from several prior changes in time thus giving the file retriever the 
ability to rollback to specific instances of the designated files at different periods in the 
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past.  Due to the increasing size of the log file, a purge cycle is performed on the log after 
a certain amount of time has passed to keep the log file size manageable.  This system is 
achieved through the replacement of several system calls dealing with the file system: 
sys_open, sys_write, and sys_close.  At the time sys_open is called, a new entry in the 
log is created and old logs lasting beyond a specific time are purged.  The sys_write 
function keeps a copy of the modifications performed to the file.  The sys_close function 
closes the file descriptor and the log descriptor.  This paper also performs some 
rudimentary overhead analysis showing the extra costs of the new system calls typically 
result in an overhead of 53-65% as compared to the regular system calls. 
Sebek [18] is a data-capturing tool designed to record malicious activities on 
Honeynets [19], and it allows researchers to bypass the need to break session encryption 
during an attack by circumventing it altogether.  Sebek resides entirely in kernel space 
and records data accessed by users through monitoring system calls.  Some of the 
information recorded includes keystrokes, files transferred via SCP, passwords used to 
log into the remote system, and all sys_read data.  All sys_read data is captured by 
replacing the stock sys_read function with a modified version.  The new sys_read simply 
calls the original function after transmitting a copy of the contents to the logging server.  
Due to the nature of the Honeynet, it is safe to assume that all traffic to the honeypot 
computers are considered suspect and therefore should be logged by Sebek.  The Sebek 
architecture has two components, clients and servers.  Clients are installed on honeypot 
machines and transmit all activities to the Sebek server for collection via hidden packets.  
This separation of clients and servers is done to mask the logging activities from attackers 
while increasing the difficulty for attackers to falsify the logging data.  The goal of the 
captured data is to allow researchers to reconstruct the events on the honeypot during the 
intrusion after it has occurred.  With this information, it is possible to determine when the 
attack occurred, how the attackers broke into the system, and what modifications the 
attackers performed on the system. 
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Giffin et al in [22] introduced the concept of environment sensitive intrusion 
detection.  In this work, event sequences that cannot be corr ctly generated in the current 
environment are restricted.  This is achieved by comparing system-call arguments with 
shared objects of the target executable.  Giffin et al demonstrated that their technique 
performed significantly better than prior approaches against  variety of attacks. 
A collection of common system call monitoring utilities is provided by most 
modern operating systems.  These utilities include trace, strace, truss, ptrace, and others.  
This set of utilities, when given a specific program, will capture the trace of the system 
calls the target program performs, the signals it receiv s, and the machine faults that 
occur.   
SystemTap [24], an open source project that is released under the GPL, provides 
an infrastructure to assist in the gathering of information about the running Linux system.  
SystemTap allows users to develop tapset script libraries for a verity of uses, such as 
placing a tap on a specified system call.   This is achieved through adding kernel modules 
to provide debug information in the kernel.  The advantage of SystemTap is that users no 
longer have to recompile and reinstall kernel files in order to monitor a particular system 
call.  Developers can use this utility to debug their work more easily. 
NSA originally developed Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [25] [26] [28] 
[29] as a research prototype of the Linux kernel with enhanced security features 
enforcing mandatory access control.  In SELinux, the concept of root access is ignored as 
all programs are given the minimum privileges required for execution.  This will deter 
many forms of attack as well as rendering some common Linux exploits ineffective.   
While SELinux supports a variety of access control policy models, its main focus 
has been an extended type enforcement (TE) model.  Traditional TE models have subject 
types, object types, and access control, which are represented by the permissions of the 
subject types to the object types.  In SELinux, the distinction between subject and object 
types has been removed, so the only types are object types that may also act as subject 
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types [25].  The “allow” statement grants permission for a certain type to perform 
operations on another type.  Since any element of the permission relationship can be 
expressed with this statement, it is possible for the expression to contain the lowest 
number of privileged rights. 
One major drawback with SELinux is the difficulty in configuring the system 
securely for individual administrators.  Although, SELinux comes with a default example 
policy, it is still very difficult to configure properly.  The default policy does not define a 
secure system, but is intended as input for the development of a custom policy that suits 
the goals of individual users.  Moreover, since the application policies are specialized to 
the environment in which they were developed, interactions between policies of multiple 
applications may lead to vulnerabilities. Thus, combining policies that have been proven 
secure may introduce security loopholes.  The task of customization is further 
complicated by the sheer size of the example policy (over 50,000 statements in the 
example policy for Linux 2.4.19), and this represents over 700 subject types and 100,000 
permission assignments [25]. This size and complexity make it difficult for typical 
administrators to customize to insure protection of their trusted computing baes and to 
satisfy their security needs.   
Trent Jaeger, Reiner Sailer, and Xiaolan Zhang presented an approach for 
analyzing the integrity protection in the SELinux example olicy [25].  Using their 
analysis tool, Gokyo, Jaeger et al examined the SELinux policies with their defined 
integrity goals to identify conflicts and to estimate th resolutions.  Their ultimate goal 
was to define a minimal trusted computing base (TCB) for SELinux that includes 30 
“subject” types.  In their research, Jaeger et al used th  Clark-Wilson integrity model and 
attempted to capture the notion that vulnerability exists when a higher integrity process 
cannot handle input from lower integrity processes.  In the Clark-Wilson model, 
constrained data items (CDIs) were defined as high-integrity data that was processed only 
by certified transformation procedures (TPs), which can also process unconstrained data 
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items (UDIs).  Integrity verification procedures (IVPs) can be used to verify the integrity 
of CDIs at particular times.  The actual model can be represented by the following set of 
rules: 
• Each TP operates on a particular list of CDIs and CDIs are only manipulated 
by a TP. 
• The system must contain a list of subjects, TPs, and the CDIs those TPs may 
reference, and only those references are permitted. 
• The system must authenticate the identity of each user who attempts to 
execute a TP. 
• The list of TPs and IVPs can only be changed by a subject permitted to certify 
those TPs and IVPs. 
 
In their results, Jaeger et al noticed several conflicts n the dpkg_t, initrc_t, 
kernel_t,  local_login_t, mount_t, sysadm_t, and sshd_t processes.  Most of these 
conflicts stem from differences between trusted subject types and the pseudo-terminals 
that they share with user processes, and the permission assignment differences.  
However, the minimal TCB containing only 30 types that meet the Clark-Wilson 
integrity requirements have been found and this may lead to more customizable and user 
friendly SELinux policies. 
In [26], Chad Hanson attempted to improve the Multi-Level Scurity (MLS) 
model within SELinux.  The existing MLS policy maps permission  of a security class to 
a set of MLS base permissions.  In the proposed system, a flexible mechanism that allows 






2.4 System Calls 
Currently, there are 325 system calls in the Linux 2.6.23 kernel syscall_table.S 
file (see appendix A).  Additionally, there are also other system calls not listed in this file 
such as those for network access which are declared in /net/socket.c that are accessed 
through a single gateway system call.  Due to these larg  numbers of system calls, user 
mode processes must pass a parameter known as the system call number to identify the 
required system call.  Figure 3 shows the typical process when invoking a system call.  
Many of these system calls are either redundant or are a part of legacy code.  For 
example, sys_creat is simply a wrapper function for sys_open with the O_CREAT flag 
enabled. 
 
Figure 3. Invoking System Calls 
The parameters passed by the system calls are different tha  that of normal C 
functions.  For normal functions, the parameters are usually passed by writing their 
values to the active program stack, be it the User Mode stack or the Kernel Mode stack.  
For system calls, the parameters are written to the registers before issuing the system call, 
and then the kernel copies the parameters from the registers to the Kernel Mode stack 
before invoking the system call routine. 
There are many system calls pertaining with the same type of functionality, and 
thus can be grouped together under one general category.  Process system calls handle the 
behavior and invocation of processes.  File-system system calls such as open handles the 
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requests for reading and writing to files by all processes.  Network system calls such as 
accept performs the function of connecting a socket to a client. 
2.4.1 Process System Calls 
In Linux, processes are created using one or more of the following system calls. 
• sys_execve – Reads the filename of the new program from the ebx register and 
begins execution of the process. 
• sys_clone – Lightweight processes are created with this system call.  The child 
process can share a number of resources with the parent process, such as memory 
descriptors or page tables. 
• sys_fork – A process created with sys_fork does not share any resources with the 
parent process. 
• sys_vfork – A process created with sys_vfork creates a child process that shares 
the memory address space with the parent process.  However, the parent’s 
execution will be blocked until the child exits or executes a new program to avoid 
the parent from overwriting data required by the child. 
• do_fork – The do_fork function is not a system call, but it handles the clone, fork, 
and vfork system calls.  This is the function that allocates and returns the assigned 
PID of the child process. 
When a user begins the execution of a program, such as typing in /bin/ls at the 
command shell, the command shell will fork a new process, which in turn invokes 
sys_execve with the parameter of “bin/ls.”  The sys_execve function then proceeds to 
check the corresponding file, the executable format, and mo ifies the execution context 
of the current process to begin execution of the new code as soon as sys_execve 
terminates.   
2.4.2 File-system System Calls 
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Files can only be accessed by processes when they are “opened”.  To open a file, 
the process invokes the sys_open system call, which returns a file handler.  In Linux, all 
files are handled with an identifier called a file descriptor.  The file descriptor represents 
an interaction between a process and an opened file.  The same file object may be 
identified by several file descriptors in the same process. 
To access open files, the program must use a combination of the sys_read, 
sys_write, and sys_lseek functions.  When a file is opened, th  kernel sets the file pointer 
to the first byte in the file.  A process must use the lseek system call to move the file 
pointer to the specified location.  Once there, the process can begin either reading or 
writing to the file with the read and write system calls.  Finally, when a process is done 
accessing a file, it must invoke sys_close to release the open file object.  When a process 
terminates, all remaining opened files are automatically released. 
A list of file-system system calls: 
sys_access sys_chdir sys_chmod sys_chown sys_chroot 
sys_close sys_creat sys_dup sys_dup2 sys_dupfd 
sys_fchdir sys_fchmod sys_fchown sys_fdatasync sys_flock 
sys_fstat sys_fsync sys_ftruncate sys_lchown sys_link 
sys_llseek sys_lseek sys_lstat sys_mkdir sys_mknod 
sys_mount sys_msync sys_open sys_pread sys_pwrite 
sys_read sys_readlink sys_rename sys_rmdir sys_stat 
sys_symlink sys_truncate sys_umount sys_unlink sys_ustat 
sys_write 
2.4.3 Network System Calls 
The system calls pertaining to the network are defined in /net/socket.c.  The actual 
entries of these networking system calls in the system call table, however, are 
nonexistent.  In Linux, all networking related system calls are accessed through a 
gateway system call named sys_socketcall.  Sys_socketcall takes in a parameter for the 
type of networking call required and calls the appropriate sub-function.  Appendix A lists 
the networking system calls under the gateway system call sys_socketcall (#104). 
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2.4.4 Other System Calls 
Due to the large number of system calls existing in Linux, we choose to target the 
system calls for process control, file access, and networking to demonstrate a proof of 
concept for our monitoring and trust building methodology.  The remaining system calls 
listed in appendix A that were not discussed can also be tapped for additional sources of 




SURVEY OF MONITORING AND COUNTERMEASURE 
TECHNIQUES 
3.1 Program Monitoring 
Research into program analysis methods has been started since the 1960s [10].  
The two major methods of analysis are static and dynamic.  Static analysis considers 
program activities based on the program instruction code without consideration of its 
execution.  On the other hand, dynamic analysis is based on explicit observations of 
execution histories and behavior.  Early on program monitori g techniques focused on 
primarily execution monitoring.  This was achieved through user-controlled break points, 
tracing, observing and setting values of variables, and local modification of the program 
(patching).  Most of the early execution monitors were developed for assembly 
languages, but were soon applied to higher level programming languages.   
3.1.1 Debugging 
Most modern microprocessors now contain features in their CPU design to assist 
in debugging such as having hardware support that allows users to step through the 
program one line at a time with the trap flag [47].  Debuggin  programs is a widely used 
approach, providing many insights to aid in error detection and program optimization.  A 
common debugger allows programmers to obtain information such as register values and 
memory contents.  Debuggers also help users in cracking software by allowing them to 
execute or skip over certain subroutines such as those dealing with protecting the 
software.  Some of the earliest debugging system techniques involved using a 
preprocessor to convert debugging statements into source statements.  These source 
statements were then compiled together with the program to be monitored.   
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The evolutions of debuggers have migrated away from being language specific as 
were the debuggers of the sixties.  Today, one of the most widely used debugging utility 
is GDB: The GNU Project Debugger [30] (created in 1986).  GDB allows users to debug 
programs written in many languages such as Ada, C, C++, Pascal, etc.  Also, GDB can 
even work remotely and debug programs executing on other machines.   
Debuggers perform their task using the information generated by the compiler to 
associate the source code with machine addresses where the program is executing.  This 
allows the debugger to see the corresponding source code.  This is achieved by inserting 
breakpoint instructions into special positions of the code or by using the compiler to 
generate stop instructions that will make programs wait for instructions from a supervisor 
program.  The prior solution is successful when the debugger has access to the code 
stream and can modify it.  The second solution is used when t e code is in read only 
memory and modifications are not possible. 
3.1.2 Injection 
Code injection is a technique to insert code into a program by taking advantage of 
unenforced and unchecked assumptions for program inputs [31].  This is often done 
through the use of a buffer overflow on the unchecked input.  Malicious users often apply 
this method of attack to gain unauthorized root access or to insert malware into the 
compromised system (such as buffer overflow).  Code inject on has other uses as well.   
For example a user may wish to modify the behavior of prgrams or simply to insert 
additional software breakpoints for debugging purposes.  There ar  several reasons why 
this approach is used, such as when modifying the software is either impossible or 
prohibitively costly. 
There are several types of code injection techniques.  The first of which is 
categorized as script injection to take advantage of unchecked entries in web applications.  
In this type of injection, additional code is added into input buffers and then is executed 
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by other users as part of the background code.  Figure 4, we see that a web server has a 
standard guest book script that accepts small messages from users.  If this input is 
unchecked, then it is possible for someone to embed some cde into this guest book with 
a message shaped like standard scripting language to hijack the website.  Once this is 
done, any subsequent visitors to this page can be targeted by he injected code. 
 
The second type of code injection is from stack smashing.  Fi ure 5a shows the 
normal operation of a function call and the stack.  The first method of stack smashing is 
the standard stack based buffer overflow as shown in Figure 5b.  In this scenario, the 
buffer is filled with data until the return address is replaced to point to the injected code 
segment.  In Figure 5c, only the saved frame pointer is overwritten, and thus when the 
current calling function is popped off the stack, it will follow the injected return address 
to the code segment.  If the attacker cannot overwrite the return address or frame pointer 
due to some countermeasures, they can use a method called indir ct pointer overwriting 
Figure 4. Simple code injection example 
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as shown in 5d.  In this case, the overflow is used to overwrite the local variable that is 
pointing to value1 and redirect the pointer to the return address instead.  Next, the pointer 
is then de-referenced and the value it points to is changed at some point in function 1 to 
an attacker-specified value.  This indirect pointer overwriting method allows the attacker 
to overwrite any memory location, and any pointer to code that will later be executed 
could be used for an attacker to overwrite. 
 
Figure 5.  Stack smashing.  a(top left) Standard stack execution, b(t p right) Basic stack 
smashing, c(bottom left) Frame pointer overwrite, d(bottom right) Indirect pointer 
overwriting. {Source: [31]} 
 
3.1.3 Memory Scanning 
A memory scan is performed by recording the state of the working memory of a 
computer program at specified time intervals.  In effect, this is taking a snapshot of the 
program during execution and dumping it to a disk.  The contents of a memory dump 
contain the information from the dumped regions of the address space of the process.  
Users can then examine these contents offline to minimize the interference with the 
program execution.  Finally, there are many downloadable toos such as objdump that can 
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be used to analyze memory dumps.  Moreover, since all instructions must be executed as 
clear text, it is possible to obtain the current executing code that is residing in memory. 
3.1.4 Tracing 
Program tracing can be performed with several methods, which include system call 
tracing, library call tracing, and execution path tracing.  System call tracing, with tools 
such as strace in Linux, is a technique where all system calls of a process, return values 
of those system calls, as well as the parameters passed to those system calls are 
intercepted and recorded.  System call tracing is a valuable too  for users to diagnose and 
solve problems where the source code is not readily available.  A great deal of 
information about the program can be obtained by examining its interactions with the 
kernel.  This information can be used to perform sanity checks and to detect race 
conditions.  Execution path tracing takes place on several l vels such as conditional 
branch tracing and instruction flow tracing.  These tracing methods allow users to 
construct a standard behavior pattern for the executable containing information such as 
the frequency of the branches taken or the number of instructions executed in a single 
execution.  Finally, library call tracing, such as ltrace, gives details about the library files 
in use by the target program.  All of these tracing techniques, however, are single process 
oriented and are invoked statically [48] [49].   
3.1.5 Decompiling 
The translation of an executable into assembly or higher-lev l languages is called 
decompiling.  The success of this process depends on the amount of information present 
in the original executable as well as the cleverness of the analysis performed on the 
program.  The decompilation of a program is often broken up into several stages: loader, 
disassembly, program and type analysis, structuring, and finally code generation [50].  In 
the loader phase, the basic architecture of the program and m in function are examined.  
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 The objective of this phase is to locate the program entry point and discover the 
architecture the program was compiled on.  The disassembly process translates the 
machine code into assembly language.  During program and type analysis, the 
expressions and the type of value in the program are reconstructed.  The structuring 
process rebuilds the loops along with the if/then/else commands of the program.  Finally, 
the code generation phase attempts to recreate the high-level code.  Figure 6 shows a 
sample piece of code during the decompiling process. 
 
Figure 6. The decompilation of code 
 
3.2 Anti Monitoring Techniques 
Encrypted executables employ a wide variety of techniques that deter code re-
engineering efforts.  In particular, good program encryptors must overcome the methods 
described in the previous section.  The following two dilemmas are faced by all program 
encryptor creators: 
• To be able to execute, the code of the program must eventually be decrypted at 
some point.  Thus, the encrypted executable must have the ability to access the 
encryption keys for the images.  Because of this, encryption is simply a way to 
make it extremely difficult for attackers to retrieve those keys.   
• The attackers have complete control of the operating environments.  The goal of 
writing a program is to be able to sell and distribute th software to users.  
However, this also allows attackers to obtain copies of the software and run them 
on customized reverse engineering environments such as virtual machines and 
  
 24 
modified kernels.  There is no way program encryption can completely block 
reverse engineering attempts.  However, good program encryption can deter such 
attacks for a long time.  
This section will provide the reader with a survey of the common methods 
employed in encrypting executables. 
3.2.1 Encryption 
The first and most obvious method is the idea of encrypting the binary to defeat 
static disassembly.  There are many executable encryptors available for this task, such as 
Shiva and UPX.  To increase the security of the program, it is also possible to employ 
multiple layers of encryption.  Thus, in order to decrypt key portions of the program, one 
must peel back the layers of encryption like peeling the lay rs of an onion.  A program 
for encrypting ELF-binaries is actually a combination of two programs: the encryptor, 
which performs the execution process and wraps up the target executable, and the 
decryptor, which is a statically-linked executable that performs the decryption and 
handles runtime processing [33].  The decryptor is often embedded into the encrypted 
executable and is completely self-contained, and it does n t rely on linking to any library 
files.  
Figure 7 demonstrates how multiple layers of encryption can be employed by a 
program encryptor.  The highest layer is most often the obfuscation layer.  This layer is 
intended to be easy to implement, can avoid simple static analysis.  See section 3.2.5 for 
obfuscation techniques. 
Underneath the obfuscation layer frequently comes the password layer, which 
employs strong encryption techniques such as 256-bit AES and wraps the executable 
using this method.  The key used for this encryption will be the SHA1 hash of the 
password used to encrypt the program itself, and thus the encryption is only as strong as 
the password.  The crypt block layer is the third and innermost layer, where the binary is 
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broken up into many code segments called blocks.  The encryption used on the block 
contents is typically very strong and unpublicized to further increase the difficulty of 
analysis.  The code to generate the keys for this layer is pseudo-random and is never 
stored in plain text inside the program at any given point.  Typically the decryptor 
performs this by interacting with the dynamic linker resid nt on the system.  This is done 
by mapping the dynamic linker and then having the decryptor regain control after the 
linker is done.  Dynamically linking permits the program to load and unload routines at 
runtime, which in turn allows those routines to be encrypted and only decrypted on 
demand. 
 
Figure 7.  Multiple layers of encryption 
 
3.2.2 Integrity Checks 
Code integrity checkers can be employed to prevent attacks from modifying 
instructions such as code injection.  Although the use of checksums will slow down 
program execution, they provide the benefit of making it difficult for users to insert code 
into the executable without first disabling the checksums.  There are also several methods 
that will improve the difficulty of disabling the checksums.  To increase the difficulty of 
detection, it is possible to randomize the checksum operators and to make them 
polymorphic.  To enhance the difficulty of removing the cksums, the values computed 
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by the checksums can be used in a non-trivial task, such as using the result to calculate 
the address of the next code segment. 
3.2.3 Anti Debugging 
Anti-debugging and emulator detection techniques are employed to prevent the 
examination of the source code through debugging and emulation tools.  There are 
debugging detection methods such as using tick timers to detect abnormally long periods 
of execution time and exploiting certain properties of the operating system to prevent 
their function.  For example, the Shiva encryption program t kes advantage of the Linux 
property that no program can be traced by multiple sources at the same time through two 
forked processes tracing each other.  This method can also be used to detect if certain 
debugging programs, such as gdm, is currently using ptrace on the executable.  If a 
program tries to invoke ptrace on itself and fails, then it knows that it is currently under 
analysis by a debugger using ptrace.   
 




 jmp label + 1 
label:   DB  0xe9 
 mov  eax, 0xf001 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Disassembly of code: 
# objdump –M intel –d anti02 
Anti02: file format elf32-i386 
08048080 <start>: 
 8048080: e9 01 00 00 00 jmp 8048086 <label+0x1> 
 
08048085 <label>: 
 8048085: e9 b8 01 f0 00  jmp 0f48242 <__bss_start+0xeff1b6> 
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A second method to defeat debugging is by jumping into the middle of an 
instruction to defeat linear sweep.  Figure 8 gives a short sample of code that hides an 
instruction from objdump.  In this example, we show an instruction which assembles into 
more than 1 byte where objdump will not follow the jump command and will just 
disassemble the program linearly from start to end.  The result is that objdump ignored 
the jump destination and disassembled the instruction directly following the first jmp.  As 
shown in this figure, the 0xe9 byte was also displayed as a jmp instruction and thus the 
move operation became hidden. 
Finally, it is also possible to detect breakpoints generated by common debuggers 
such as gdb.  Gdb sets breakpoints by replacing the byte at th ddress to break with an 
int 3 Opcode, which is 0xcc [34].  Thus, it is easy for a program to check addresses for 
0xcc as shown in figure 9. 
 





3.2.4 Virtual Machine Detection 
Virtual machine emulators such as VMware can be detected by xamining the hardware 
that it is supposed to emulate, such as having VMware Inc [VMware SVGA II] PCI 
Display Adapter for the video card [20].  VMware also has an interface used to configure 
VMware during runtime and can be accessed with several special assembly commands.  
Unfortunately, encryption programs can easily add in code t use these commands to 
determine whether if the machine they are attacking is running VMware as well. 
 
3.2.5 Obfuscation 
The goal of code obfuscation is two fold, to protect the code from being reverse 
engineered, and to make it more difficult for someone to create a generic unwrapper for 
this software.  This is achieved by rendering the code unreadable to users and to defeat 
common disassembly techniques [51].  Although code obfuscation can slow down code 
study and avoid direct code stealing, it also slows down the application and will increase 
the software size. 
There are several common techniques used for code obfuscation: 
• Dynamically computed calls – The jmp and call values are calculated at run time 
to make it difficult to follow the code statically.  Functions are not invoked 
directly but with address pointers that are calculated using other means, such as 
subtracting a constant from the checksum of the previous c de block. 
• Opaque predicates – Although the result of such an operation is known ahead of 
time logically, branch predictors will begin code execution of the sub branches 
while the computation of the statement is being processed.  If a computationally 
intensive statement is used, then it further increases the amount of dummy code 
that requires analysis.  Here in the following example (figure 10), the cosine of 
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any value cannot be greater than 1 and thus the code inside the conditional 
statement should never affect the program execution. 
• Execution flow disruption – False exceptions can be raised by the program and 
shaped in such a way that the error handler can detect the haracteristic.  If it is a 
fake error, the error handler will perform decoy tasks uch as tweaking memory 
addresses and registers before returning to the calling code.
• Junk insertion – Junk bytes can be inserted into code to cause disassembly errors.  
These junk bytes must satisfy two qualities: they must be partial instructions, and 
must be inserted in such a way that they are unreachable at runtime [51].  To 
achieve this goal, code is broken up into block segments that end with 
unconditional control transfers, and junk bytes are inserted in between these 
blocks. 
 
Figure 10. Opaque predicate example 
 
3.2.6 Kernel Module Detection 
Often, encrypted executables employ various tasks to detect th  existence of 
recording tools and replaced system calls as others attempt to reverse engineer the 
program.  In [20] part 2, Thorsten Holz and Frederic Raynal discussed methods attackers 
could use to detect Sebek on honeypot machines.  The Linux version of Sebek is a 
loadable kernel module that has similar properties as a rootkit.  This is achieved through 
the unlinking  of  the last module in the module list.  This unlinking allows Sebek to 
remain hidden from programs such as lsmod, but Sebek still has an easily detectible 
module header structure resident in memory.  In [35], Dornseif et al mentions that since 
Sebek provides its own sys_read function, it has to modify the system call table to update 
if ( cos(sin(x)) > 1 ) { 
// perform dummy operations  } 




the pointer from the original sys_read function to the modified version.  This will cause 
the addresses of the sys_read and sys_write functions to be very different, which allow 
hackers to detect that one of these functions may have been modified at some point.  
Unmodified read and writes tend to be near each other in the memory address range.  
Dornseif et al also found that it is possible to avoid l gging commands into Sebek by 
using the mmap system call.  Rather than using sys_read to open files, a hacker can 
employ mmap to map files directly into memory and bypass the logging capabilities of 
Sebek completely.  Finally, it is possible for attackers to detect the traffic Sebek generates 
by performing an operation that makes heavy usage of sys_read, such as doing a dd of 
/dev/zero and writing it to /dev/null.  The amount of traffic generated by Sebek 
introduces a noticeable delay of over 4800 milliseconds in packet round trip time.  The 
informed developer for the encrypted software will take dvantage of this knowledge and 
build in detections for such events and even attempt to shut down such monitoring 
methods. 
3.3 Examples of Encrypted Programs 
Skype is an overlay peer-to-peer (P2P) voice over IP (VoIP) program that has 
come under scrutiny from many researchers [12] [14] due to the intricate security and 
encryption techniques employed in the executable file.  There are two types of nodes in 
the Skype network, basic nodes and super nodes.  Any node having a public IP address 
and meeting sufficient system requirements has the potential to become a super node.  
Baset and Schulzrinne performed a study in 2004 [12] to examine Skype in greater detail.  
Their goal was to determine key Skype functions such as login, NAT and firewall 
traversal, call establishment, media transfer, codecs, and conferencing under different 
network setups.  In their study, Baset and Schulzrinne determined that Skype was able to 




At the Blackhat Europe conference in 2006, Philippe Biondi and Fabrice 
Desclaux presented the results of their attempts at penetrati g the encryption methods 
employed in Skype [14].  The usage of Skype is a concern for many network security 
administrators at major corporations because of its secretive nature.  The very first 
technique Skype employs is code encryption.  Rather than havi g the entire Skype 
program decrypted in memory at any given time during execution, Skype applies 
techniques to hide portions of its code until the instructions need to be executed.  
Moreover, during the decryption process, Skype erases previously decrypted code along 
with overwriting portions of its import table.  Thus, at any instance of execution, only a 
small portion of the total code is unencrypted and it is also unclear which portion of the 
program this section of code came from.  This anti-dumping technique defeats the 
possibility of observing instructions during the runtime of Skype. 
There are also intensive code integrity checks in Skype.  From [14], we see that 
overall, there were nearly 300 checksums embedded in the source code.  These 
checksums were encrypted and the checksum operators were randomized.  Finally, the 
values computed by the checksums are used by Skype to perform a non-trivial task, such 
as determining the pointer for the next code segment.  These checksums make it 
impossible to insert software breakpoints into the program, which is one method for 
program monitoring.  Moreover, Skype employs several tick timers that attempt to detect 
abnormally long execution periods, once the tick timers reach a certain count, the 
program will randomize the registers and jump to a randomized page. 
Building a program profile for Skype is also a difficult task due to the lack of 
behavior patterns.  In fact, the developers of Skype intentionally obfuscated the code by 
inserting randomized behavior.  For instance, there are many dynamically calculated 
opaque predicates that make Skype difficult to follow statically.  Other code 
randomizations can occur where Skype performs a series of calculations based on a 
randomly calculated condition and proceeds to disregard the result.  Finally, Skype can 
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generate fake errors and raise fake exceptions.  If a fake error is generated, the handler 
simply tweaks some memory addresses and registers and then re urns to the calling code.  
Skype encrypts all digital content it transmits to and receives from the network.  This 
makes it difficult to determine whether if the activity Skype performs is malicious or 
benign.  Moreover, Skype often sends and receives information to portions of the 
network even when the user is not actively using the program to make a VoIP call.  
Finally it is impossible to determine if the latest update to Skype has installed a backdoor 
to the program due to its encrypted nature. 
Shiva [6] [32] [33] is a free binary encryptor developed to encrypt ELF 
executables under Linux.  Executables encrypted by Shiva continue to run as normal but 
are more difficult to reverse engineer.  In their presentation [33], Clowes and Mehta 
presented the idea behind the creation of Shiva: to offer a method to prevent trivial 
reverse engineering of algorithms, to protect setuid programs with passwords, and to hide 
sensitive data and code segments in the programs.  Theirfirst goal is to render the 
ptrace() API ineffective and thus defending against common Linux tools that rely on that 
API such as ltrace, strace, fenris, and gdb.  Next, Shiva attempts to embed many active 
detections of monitoring attempts into the target program.  Third, Clowes and Mehta 
noticed that static analysis becomes much more difficult if the executable is encrypted on 
more than one level.  This led to the development of layers similar to that of an onion 
where attackers must strip each layer of the encryption before attacking the next layer.  
Finally, adding in unpredictable behavior that differs from ne executable to the other 
makes the encryption method less standard and thus makes it harder to create a generic 
unwrapper.  Shiva contains two separate components, an encryption process that 
performs the encryption and wrapping of the executable, and a decryption process that 
performs decryption and handles runtime processing.  The decryption process is 
embedded within the encryption portion of the program and is completely self-contained.  
Finally, the main executable thread will create a controller process (a clone) so that both 
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threads can trace each other, thus effectively locking other programs from performing 
tracing on the program due to the Linux property that no thread can simultaneously be 
traced by more than one other thread at any given time.  The authors also mentioned 
future work on Shiva which includes dividing programs into blocks at compile-time so 
only one block at a time will be decrypted during execution.   
In [1], Amit Singh brought attention to the use of encrypted binaries in the new 
operating system from Apple computers.  In his article, Singh stated that the use of 
encrypted programs is one solution Apple came up with to make the process of running 
Mac OS X on none Apple hardware “non-trivial.”  The Apple binaries are Mach-O files 
containing one or more AES-encrypted segments.  A simple search that looks for Mach-
O files with encrypted properties turns up the following list of programs: dock, finder, 
loginwindow, systemuiserver, mds, atsserver, and translate. 
In summary, the field for program encryption is very active as innovative methods 
of encryption and anti-reverse-engineering methods are being explored daily.  As the 
number of commonplace encrypted program grows, so will the necessity of monitoring 





ON DEMAND SYSTEM CALL MONITORING METHODOLOGY 
 
There is currently no methodology to establish user trust in encrypted programs 
with program monitoring.  Since statistical analysis does not work due to program 
encryption does not work, runtime monitoring methods must be examined.   We believe 
that such a monitoring and trust developing methodology will be needed in the future as 
more and more executables become encrypted due to increasing security and anti-piracy 
concerns.  Even today, encrypted executables such as Skype pres nt a great security 
threat to companies [12].  Our initial interest in this reearch area came about as a result 
of several publications about the potential risk of Skype and the lack of a good solution 
for administrators to use in insuring the safety of their system.  We believe that 
implementing on demand system calls for the execution of e crypted programs is the best 
type of mechanism to incorporate into the kernel, as all requests to access the underlying 
resources must go through this gateway.  Below is a discussion of key concepts for 
system call monitoring, trust development, and detection methods using the gathered data 
to obtain a trust development architecture.   
4.1 Architecture and Methodology Overview 
As previously described, system call monitoring is not a new concept.  However, the 
thrust of this approach is to provide a system wide safety n t to catch potential 
misbehaving actions of encrypted software, unlike previous system call monitoring 
techniques and utilities that focus on system call sequences or on individual programs.  
We argue that this is necessary due to the intrinsic obsurity of these black-box programs 
since it is unknown what parts of the system are being accessed and what processes the 
black box program may spawn off or modify.  Our approach of all wing users to execute 
encrypted software on their system can be broken down into several stages: 
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• Data Acquisition – We must modify the kernel to insert additional code at the 
system calls and to provide support to extract information out of the kernel space 
into user space for proper storage and handling. 
• Monitoring and Analysis – During this phase, the gathered data is analyzed to be 
presented in an effective manner to the user.  Also, potential risks and warnings 
about any software currently in execution are logged. 
• Display – The results from the analysis must be presentd to the user in an 
effective and intuitive manner. 
 
By modifying the system calls themselves and thus adding in an additional 
monitoring layer to the actual system call layer as shown in figure 11, we minimize our 
impact on program execution and lower our chances of detection or modification by 
encrypted software.  Our goal is not to be able to revers - ngineer programs but to ensure 
the user that their sensitive system information and processes are not disrupted by the 
execution of such software. 
 
Figure 11. Modified system call layer 
The critical component of the trust development architectur  is the system call data 
gathering agent that is residing in the kernel.  There are sev ral locations in the kernel 
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where this data acquisition can take place, the syscall handler, at program startup by 
invoking strace on all new processes, and at the actual system call functions (see figure 
12).  There are tradeoffs with each of these approaches as we have to consider overhead, 
ease of modification, security, and customizability.   
The invocation of strace upon every process startup is a simple means of 
obtaining the necessary system call information.  The main draw back of this approach 
was discussed before.  Any processes that are already bing traced cannot be traced by 
another process.  Thus, invoking strace or ptrace on all system processes will disable 
many utilities and features such as gdb.  The other two locations in the linux kernel where 
data acquisition can take place can be considered in further detail.  Both tapping the 
syscall handler and the functions themselves provide diff rent security and monitoring 
benefits.  By tapping just the system call handler, we are still able to aquire data and we 
can ignore potential changes at other system calls, such as sys_read being replaced and 
are still able to acquire data.  In using this data acquisition location, the syscall handler 
becomes the single point of failure and thus should it be replaced by an attacker, then all 
system call information will be lost. 
 
Figure 12.  Three possible locations for system call monitori g. 
The approach we choose to use was to modify individual system calls so as to 
monitor various aspects of the operating system.  One of the primary concerns in the 
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modification of the kernel is the possible introduction of too much excessive code and the 
possible generation of too much data.  If we tapped the systm call handler, additional 
code must be introduced to ignore every unwanted system calls.  On the other hand, it is 
possible to simply record all system call activity, but this approach can result in an 
overwhelming amount of data.  Thus, we choose to modify target specific system calls to 
evaluate our methodology. 
To be able to successfully monitor a process, a basic minimum set of system calls 
must be instrumented to obtain information.  These are: sys_execve, sys_fork, and 
sys_open.  These three system calls provides critical information about the program being 
executed, such as its binary filename, all the child processes, and the files accessed by 
that program.  The logging mechanism will always be active due to the relatively 
infrequent hits to them when compared to other system calls.
The data gathered at the system call level must be exported to user space for 
storage.  The process used to perform this phase takes advantage of the kernel message 
buffer.  First, the size of the kernel message buffer is increased to lower the possibility of 
the buffer being overflowed due to excessive volume of data.  Second, using this buffer 
allowed us to take advantage of the inherent kernel message-prioritizing property of the 
kernel message daemon.  Figure 13 is a sample of raw sys_open data.  The first column 
denotes the system call, followed by the pid, timestamp in seconds and micro seconds, 
the target file, the file descriptor number, the inode f the file, and a flag for successful or 
unsuccessful open.  The data gathered from these modified system calls are then stored in 
a SQL database for easy access and searching by the analysis phase. 
 








4.2 Trust Development 
To develop trust in a black-box program, the program system call behavior is 
compared against a list of policies of the operating system.  We begin by subdividing our 
system calls into several categories. 
σ represents a system call 
Τ represents the operating system 
Τ(σ) represents applying the system call to the operating system. 
µ represents memory 
∆ represents a change, i.e. ∆µ represents a change in memory 
Σ = { Ω, Φ, Λ, Μ, Ζ, Ρ }  - all system calls 
Ω = {execve, fork, open}   – baseline calls 
Φ = {read, write, lseek, …}   – file system calls 
Λ = {socket, connect, listen …}  – network calls 
Μ = {mmap, munmap, mlock …}  – memory calls 
Η = {getpriority, setpriority, …}  – system operation calls 
Θ = {all other system calls}   – all other calls 
A second method of categorizing system calls is based on the type of modification 
is performed by the system call on the operating system: 
Α ∈ Σ : ∀σ ∈ Σ where Τ(σ) = Τ   - subset of calls that only reads data 
Β ∈ Σ : ∀σ ∈ Σ where Τ(σ) = Τ + ∆µ  - subset of calls that modifies memory 
Γ ∈ Σ : ∀σ ∈ Σ where Τ(σ) ≠ Τ   - subset of calls that writes to I/O 
Ψ ∈ Σ : σ ∉{ Α ∪ Β ∪ Γ}   - system calls that cannot be categorized 
We further break down the subcategory of system calls that creates output into 
three groups: 
Ν ∈ Γ   - subset of calls that writes data to user interfaces, such as the monitor 
Ζ ∈ Γ  - subset of calls that writes data to the file system 
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Κ ∈ Γ - subset of calls that writes data to output devices, such as network card 
It is possible, that given the previous definitions, some system calls can exist in 
multiple categories.  For instance, programs often use sys_write not only to write to files, 
but also to the monitor.  Finally, one last subdivision breaks down the calls reading or 
writing to the file system based on the degree of sensitivity of the files. 
Αp, Ζp - system calls that reads and writes files belonging to the program 
Αl, Ζl - system calls that reads and writes to library files 
Αu, Ζu - system calls that reads and writes to user files 
Αs, Ζs - system calls that reads and writes to none library system files 
Αx, Ζx - system calls that reads and writes to user defined sensitiv  files 
Based on these definitions, it is possible to come up with rules for the operating 
system to estimate the degree of trust allowed for any particul r program.  For example, 
table 1 contains some sample policies for low, medium, and high risk programs. 
 
Table 1. Example policies 
Risk Factor Policy Explanation 
Low ∀σ ∈ Program where  
σ ∈ { Ω ∪ (Φ ∩ Αpl) ∪ ( M ∩ Β ) ∪ Ν } 
Any program that read 
only from program and 
library files, performed 
memory operations, and 
output data to user devices 
such as the screen or the 
sound device is low risk. 
Medium ∀σ ∈ Program where  
σ ∈ { Ω ∪ (Φ ∩ Αpl) ∪ ( M ∩ Β ) ∪ Ν    
          ∪ Ζp  ∪  ( Λ ∩ Α ) } 
Any program that has the 
properties as the previous 
low risk program but 
additionally modified its 
own program files as well 
as read data from the 
network is medium risk. 
High ∀σ ∈ Program where  
σ ∈ { Ω ∪ Αx ∪ Ζl } 
Any program that read 
user defined sensitive files 
(such as a file containing 
their banking information) 
or modifies system library 




 4.3 Intrusion Detection  
Providing intrusion detection for encrypted software is a necessary and integral 
part of the development of user trust.  Due to its obfuscated nature, it is difficult for users 
to detect intrusions on obfuscated programs.  It is the job of the intrusion detection 
system for scanning the processes on the system for potential compromises.  If a 
compromise is detected, the IDS will build a report and transmit it to the user for 
verification.  In this section, we discuss two approaches for accomplishing successful 
intrusion detection. 
Through repeated executions of programs, it is possible to build up a profile based 
on the policies for the program.  For example, a program with a low risk factor policy 
given in table 1 that begins to issue system calls belonging to the subset is highly 
suspicious.  
The second approach to intrusion detection is based on program behavior 
profiling.  This is a combination of system call sequence monitoring and system call data 
monitoring.  For system call sequence monitoring, the actions of the program are 
examined to detect anomalous behavior that should not typically exist.  For example, any 
process that invokes sys_execve twice warrants further attntion since this is a 
characteristic of a buffer overflow followed by some injected code designed to execute 
another program.  For data monitoring, we examine the typical libraries used by the 
program and characteristic program behavior, such as the order in which library files are 
read from, and how the program creates and writes to temporary files. 
4.4 System Operation 
The procedure to accomplish our trust development and intrus on detection 
system is shown below in figure 14.  This process begins when a system call request is 
made.  Once the request is filtered down to the individual system calls, they are passed 
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through the monitoring layer, which duplicates the request and transmits it to the 
behavior intrusion detection system.  The duplicate request is checked for behavior 
characteristics and is compared to the policy profile of the process.  If an intrusion is 
detected by the behavior IDS, then a reject signal is sent to kill the system call request.  If 
the program system call request does not match the policy of the program, then user input 
is requested for verification such as when a program is requesting write access to 
/etc/passwd.  If the new policy is confirmed by the user, a “pass” signal is transmitted and 
the system call request is transmitted back to the process.  If the program request matches 
the policy profile, then a “pass” signal is transmitted as well.  In parallel with this 
operation, the monitoring layer passes the system call request through to be processed by 
the system.  Once this request has been processed by the operating system, the resulting 
reply will be held by the monitoring layer until it is determined that it is okay for the 




Figure 14. Modified system call layer 
 
4.4.1 Behavior IDS 
The behavior IDS is responsible for detecting changes in the program behavior, 
locating deviations with timing analysis, and identifying illegal operations.  This phase 
consists of several databases generated from historical system call data and process 
information.  This set of databases is then used as a baseline for new process behavior for 
anomaly detection. 
The program behavior databases are used for standard error checking, such as 
accessing typical library files and writing to files.  Each program has an associated file 
list consisting of common and uncommonly used system library files.  During every 
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execution, it is expected that these files are opened for use.  If a program begins to access 
other files during every execution without any recent modifications to the system or the 
program, then this bears further investigation.  File access behavior is similarly 
examined.  Should a program begin to write to its library files, for example, then a 
warning is generated and is brought to the attention of the user.
Timing analysis is very system and user specific.  Our approch is to analyze the 
difference in time of easily identifiable program signatures.  We believe that it is possible 
to obtain some characteristic information based on the amount of time measured by the 
system (in microseconds) from standard program access and behavior.  If a process that is 
typically resolved in X amount of time requires X+n amount of time where n > security 
threshold, this signifies a deviation from standard behavior. 
Illegal operation identification is performed by checking for illogical system call 
behavior.  This is different from the policy enforcement in that it is possible this illogical 
behavior uses only system calls allowed by the policy for the program. 
4.4.2 Policy IDS 
The policy intrusion detection system is responsible for keep track of system policies for 
all processes.  When a system call is received by the policy IDS, it is tested against the 
policies of the program to determine if the system call belongs in any subset of the 
policies.  If the check returns true, then the IDS willpass the system call.  If the check 
returns false, a warning is generated and sent to a logging file for the user to peruse at a 
later time.  If the system call belongs the categori s Ζl, Αx, Ζx, then the system call will be 




EVALUATION OF PROGRAM MONITORING 
In this section, we present the results of our research nd demonstrate some 
applications of the data gathered from system call monitori g.  First, we present our 
results from applying this method to encrypted software such as Skype and evaluate its 
success at detecting several types of viruses and exploits.  Second, we introduce a 
possible application of this research with computer forensics.  Third, we present our 
approach of the visualization our data for a more intuitive representation for users. 
5.1 Program Monitoring 
In order to evaluate our methodology to build trust in encrypted programs and the 
success of detecting intrusions, we have gathered a suite of programs, program encryptors 
and experiments that include legitimate programs and malicious code and exploits.   
5.1.1 Tools 
Below is a summary of the tools and scripts used in this experiment. 
• Sqlite3 - Sqlite3 is an open source serverless embedded SQL atabase. It uses 
a single file on the host to construct all of its datab se structures. As such, 
Sqlite3 is an excellent alternative for data storage in large applications as 
opposed to the creation of various customized file formats. The main goal 
behind the design of Sqlite3 is to make it easy to administer, operate, embed 
into programs, maintain, and customize when compared to large enterprise 
database solutions such as PostgreSQL or Oracle while maintaining simplicity 
[43].  
• Xnee Suite - Cnee and Gnee are a part of the GNU Xnee suit of tools 
designed for recording and replaying user actions.  For the recording of 
playing back user actions for our experiment, we used Gnee configured with 
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the following even list: KeyPress, KeyRelease, ButtonPress, ButtonRelease, 
MotionNotify, EnterNotify, LeaveNotify, FocusIn, and FocusOut.   
• Tinyweb - Tinyweb is an extremely small and simple daemon for tcp/http 
web-servers.  Tinyweb requires no configuration other than through the 
command line and consumes very little system resources.  In our experiment, 
we intentionally left a buffer overflow exploit at the receiving buffer for 
incoming traffic and disabled the stack smashing protection option with gcc.   
• Ubuntu with 2.6.20 kernel - The Linux system for the experimnts consists of 
a stable Ubuntu[44] hardy heron distribution running a customized 2.6.20.16 
custom kernel.     
• Emacs - A recent Emacs 22.1 design flaw published by Security Focus 
allowed the injection of code into the user-init file if a specific sequence of 
local variables were embedded a file.  It is possible for attackers to execute 
programs and other code through this Emacs exploit. 
• Linux Elf_Nel.A (Caline) - The Caline virus [38] is a simple program written 
by researchers to infect Linux executables.  When executed and given a 
parameter, the virus will attempt to attach itself to the binary. 
• UPX - The Ultimate Packer for eXecutables software is a free and portable 
executable packer that offers very high compression ratios and fast 
decompression.  UPX supports a variety of operating system environments, 
including Linux. 
5.2 Results 
In one experiment we demonstrated that our architecture an successfully monitor 
an encrypted program by the successful monitoring of Skype (see figure 15).  This figure 
denotes the files opened by Skype during startup.  While not interesting in itself, this 
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demonstrates that our monitoring method has no issues with the anti reverse-engineering 
mechanisms of Skype. 
 
Figure 15.  sys_open calls of Skype. 
 
Over a period of 4 seconds, Skype made 16 reads from /dev/urandom, attempted 
to open 394 files (238 of which were successful), and 217 writes. 
In another experiment, we simulated an attacker running a buffer overflow exploit 
on Tinyweb (Figure 16).  For the first few sequences, we see the normal operation of 
tinyweb as it accepts web requests and transmits the response by accessing the index.html 
file.  Once the exploit request is transmitted, however, we detected that the PID of 
tinyweb made a second sys_execvce call, this time as /usr/bin/sh.  This second call to 
sys_execve is highly suspect as PIDs are assigned per process and is not reused.  Thus, 
this call would immediately be marked for inspection by the program behavior database.  
After this call to /usr//sh, our attacker connects via the bound port and begins executing 
commands as root.  Each of these executions was captured by the system call monitoring 




Figure 16.  Monitoring an exploit. 
 
In the following experiment, we traced two Linux viruses, Caline and 
Linux.RST.B-1.  We first performed a scan on the two viruses and determined that 
McAfee antivirus detected them.  Next, we used the UPX program packer to pack the two 
viruses and repeated the scan.  This time, the antivirus scanner did not detect the virus 
signatures anymore.  Finally, we executed these viruses on our system and recorded the 
results.  During this execution we observed the behavior of Caline.  It is a simple virus 
designed to infect a target executable when the infected program is executed.  In the 
process, our monitoring system detected the creation of a temporary file used by Caline 
during the infection process.  For Linux.RST.B-1 we determined that the virus, when 
executed, attempts to infect as many common Linux programs in /usr/bin as possible.  
The list of detected files is presented in Figure 17.  We can also obtain an estimate of the 
age of the virus and the Linux distro it is mainly targeting based on the names of the 
  
 48 
/usr/bin files Linux.RST.B-1 attempts to open.  This is due to the fact that the contents of 
/usr/bin have changed over the years and for different distributions. 
 
Figure 17. Linux.RST.B-1 modifying /bin processes 
 
In another experiment, we tested an infection of the Emacs init file through an 
exploit of Emacs 22.1.  In this exploit, a file containing a variable list exploit allows the 
attacker to compromise the Emacs init file resulting in the addition of the payload to the 
file for execution.  We performed several analysis types with this exploit.  First, we 
captured the standard Emacs behavior during startup, and compared it to the behavior of 
Emacs if this exploit was embedded in the document being opened.  Figure 18 shows the 
results for inode usage and timing based on the two executions.  On the left, we see the 
standard emacs execution behavior.  On the right, we see the xploited emacs execution 
behavior.  There is a noticeable difference between th  timing delays of the two types of 























Figure 18. The execution on the left is standard Emacs behavior when opening a file.  





PROGRAM BEHAVIOR PROFILING 
In this chapter, we apply our program monitoring data to assist in the 
reconstruction of past historical events captured in the file system journal.  Although 
there can be a degree of error in this process, we showthat by using the captured system 
call data as a training set to create a program behavior profile of programs as seen from 
the journal, we lower the chances of misidentifying the program.  Moreover, using this 
approach gives forensic experts a new source of information that they can use to 
reconstruct past events. 
6.1 Architecture 
The generation of our program behavior database requires two components: a 
system call database and a journal entry database.  Thesemust be created concurrently 
while performing standard program and code execution on the targ t computer.  For post 
intrusion analysis, the forensic investigator will have to execute all possible permutations 
of programs on the target machine to generate this behavioral database. It should be noted 
that the use of advanced applications requires more resources which increases the 
complexity of this analysis, thereby increasing the time required for the forensic 
investigation. However, this system is designed to aid in offline orensic investigations 
and thus the retrieval of more extensive evidence offsets the heavier computational 
requirements. The database will be used to derive events from the original journal log. 
A program behavior database is created from a combination of system call and 
journal harvested metadata databases. The system call database contains information as 
seen from the operating system such as file opens, reads, writes, program executions, and 
terminations. The journaling database contains inode metadata inserted into the file 
system. By correlating the syscall data with the information that has been written to the 
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file system journal, we are able to detect a range of identifying information from the 
programs being executed on the system.  This gathered evidence allows us to identify key 





























Figure 19. Forensics Process 
 
As discussed in section 2, system call monitoring is not a new concept. However, 
in our architecture, we apply system call monitoring in a new application by using it to 
aid in file system forensics rather than intrusion detection. Our primary motivation for 
this approach is to retrieve information about the filesystem, such as file names of 




6.2 Database Generation 
 
We must first generate the program behavior database to emp wer the forensic 
investigators with the ability to reconstruct events based on the journal metadata. At this 
point in our system, we have two separate master databases containing the behavior 
information of various processes as they execute on the system in question. The next step 
is to apply our data extraction models to obtain the various program signatures for 
forensic reconstruction of events documented in the journal log. This is perhaps the most 
time consuming phase of the forensics investigation as there is often a vast quantity of 
data to dissect. Moreover, there are additional data modeling techniques that may be 
applied to these logs to create different program signatures. To demonstrate our 
architecture, however, we chose the methods described below. 
The first database generated contains program-file relationsh ps (PFR).  In this 
database, we keep track of every file required for the execution of any particular process.  
A counter is used for every instance of the program to keep track of the number of 
executions.  The inode number and filename of every file touched by that program is also 
entered into the database along with a counter showing how many times that process has 
accessed that particular file.  This information allows us to quickly identify the library 
and data files required by locating files that are read during every execution of the 
process.  Lsof produces a similar data set without the ben fit of knowing the order in 
which the files were accessed. 
The second database, using only the system call information, is a time ordered 
behavior database (TOB).  Given that most processes follow an ordered sequence of 
algorithms to perform certain tasks, we can develop an order f events for any particular 
program in terms of file accesses.  For example, some programs may choose to load all 
the libraries in one particular directory first while others will load files as needed in no 
particular order.  To generate this database, different instances of program execution are 
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compared with each other to identify the similarities and differences under varying 
program behavior.  File access orders are compared as well as the times between each file 
access. 
Similarly, several databases can be created with just the raw journal data (see 
Figure 20).  Along system call monitoring, these databases re be used to generate the 
program behavior database as well as to verify or reject d tected patterns.  The first 
column of the data is the inode number, followed by mtime, atime, ctime, and dtime.  
 
Figure 20.  Raw journal data. 
 
The first journal-based database is obtained by applying a dat clustering 
approach with a distance measure calculated by using the modification, access, creation 
and deletion time values for the inodes being considered.  With this approach, files that 
are touched in a relatively short time period from each other and files with similar inode 
numbers will be added into the database as being “related.”  As this database grows, more 
and more relations between files will be inserted, and files that become strongly related 
due to a large amount of near concurrent accesses in the system will stand out more than 
others.  This database is called the Time Relationship (TR) Database.  Several further 
refinements can be applied to the TR Database to generat  additional relationships by 
examining the specific MAC times that created the link betwe n the two inodes.  For 
example, if we repeatedly see an atime in the first file matching the mtime in a second 













Some other relationships include read-delete, read-create, rd-read, write-write, and so 
on.  Figure 21 gives an overview of our data analysis process. 
The list of files and behaviors used to uniquely identify a process is called a 
“dominant feature”.  This information is extracted from the TRD and PFR databases.  
There are times where multiple programs may share some or all library files resulting in 
the dominant features of one program masking that of the other, we call this phenomena 
data collusion.  The extraction of the library files to identify dominant features is 
performed through analyzing the PFR database.  Combining the information about the 
program library files and the TOB generates a time ordered dominate feature list.  This 






The final objective of the program behavior engine is the creation of various 
program signatures from the dominant feature extraction routines.  These signatures can 
fall under several categories such as program library files, program file access behavior, 
and time based behavior.  Program library file signatures id ntify programs based on the 
library files accessed during runtime.  Program file access behavior signatures identify 
specific methods and ordering a program uses to access fil.  Program time based 
behavior signatures identify the amount of time programs may take to perform common 
actions.  The creation of these signatures makes it possible to uniquely distinguish 
program executions from the file system journal. 
 




In this section, we will present some of the more intresting results obtained from 
our experimentation.  Thus far, we have successfully detect d the execution of programs 
through the correlation of the journal data with our datab se via dominant feature 
extraction as well as program behavior signature identification.  In the process, we have 
learned in great detail the operations of these programs and the background events that 
are typically obscured from the user.   
Applying dominant feature extraction and program behavior models to the data 
generated in the experiment identified several unique program signatures.  Several 
smaller programs were less readily identifiable due to daa collusion to be discussed later.  
The dominant feature targeted in this demonstration was the et of library and support 
files for each program.  Using our PFR database, we compared the number of times a 
program used a file during execution to the number of times a program was executed.  
Files were sorted based on priority depending on the correlation between the file usage 
and program execution.  Files accessed upon every program execution were labeled as a 
library file.  Files accessed above a certain threshold (in this case 80%) were labeled as 
potential library files.  Files with a correlation above 10% and below 80% were 
considered behavior files that relied on program usage.  All other files were considered 
temporary files that were touched in only a few scenarios.  Table 2 shows a subset of a 
file list for one program and the file categories.  
In order to distinguish a program in the event of data collusi n, additional files 
have to be added to the dominant feature list.  Although some programs may camouflage 
others, the lack of a library or data file may be telltal  distinction as well.  In our 
example, although vim uses every library file cat uses, it also uses several additional 
library files that cat does not use.  Thus, notable absnt files are also appended to the set 




Table 2. Sample /bin/cat file list 
Program - /bin/cat usage 


























The sequence of actions for each program was examined to detect uncommon 
flows of events.  In Figure 22, we show the behavior of vi and vim when editing a new 
file that was passed to the program at the prompt.  This sequence of the creation and 
deletion of the backup files .swp and .swpx upon program execution is a unique behavior 
only exhibited in vi and vim.  Using this pattern, it is then possible to detect the creation 
and editing of new files if done through these two editors. 
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Figure 22. Unique vim behavior 
 
Using the TR database, we detect relationships between fil s that are not in the 
library list of the programs.  In our example (see Figure 23), we first identify several key 
library file inodes used by each program and then examine the database to detect 
additional files that may have a correlation to those library files.  In this example, we 
know that inodes 1374711 and 2075940 are a pair of files that are opend co currently 
only by cat and vi.  With this knowledge, we examine some of the other files that have 
been given a relationship to 1374711 with roughly the same number of stablished 
relationships, and we see that inodes 2075946, 836025, and 898620 have this pattern and 
thus are potentially related to the execution of cat and vi/vim.  Examination of the PFR 
database confirms those files as being location files usd by those processes.  
 
Figure 23. Distance measure analysis. 
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False Positives False Negatives
 
Figure 24. Dominant feature extraction accuracy. 
 
We created a database of dominant features for the sample programs we chose.  
With this database, we performed dominant feature extraction on a set of journal data 
generated from the execution of these programs.  Figure 24 shows t e accuracy of our 
method when given a varying set of thresholds.  In our experiment, we define a false 
positive as a time segment incorrectly identified as a target program execution.  A false 
negative is defined as a target program execution that was not identified based on the 
journal data.  The threshold value used here is the percentage of files from the dominant 
feature list that must be matched for positive program identification.  From this graph, we 
can see that as the threshold percentage is increased to 100%, the amount of false 
positives drop to 11% while the amount of false negatives increase from 16% to 35%.  
We also can conclude that for the programs and tools used in this experiment, the optimal 
threshold value is approximately 76%. 
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We also noticed that programs with bigger dominant feature sets generated less 
false positives but more false negatives than programs with smaller sets.  There were also 
more false negatives than false positives for programs with a small dominant feature set.  
For programs that have may involve partial data collusion where they share a majority of 
libraries and files, such as vi and vim, the false positive value drops off sharply after the 
threshold is raised to be above the percentage of files that each program shares with the 
other.  Table 3 displays the false positive and negative values for one trial of 50 
executions of vi and vim.  From this table, we can conclude that between 70% to 80% of 
the files in the dominant feature set of vim is also a subset of vi while almost 100% of the 
dominant feature set of vi is a subset of vim. 
Table 3. Vi and vim accuracy comparison 
Threshold - 
vim False Positive # False Negative #
50 127 0 
60 89 0 
70 46 1 
80 0 4 
90 0 49 
100 0 49 
 
Threshold – vi   
50 149 0 
60 149 0 
70 93 0 
80 49 0 
90 46 1 
100 0 1 
 
The first type of program behavior matching we performed was the identification 
of read-write relationships.  During a trial execution, we created, edited, copied, and 
deleted various test files using our chosen programs.  Using the data collected with 
metadata archiving [4], we built our TR database and extracted file pairings that exhibited 
this read-write relationship.  Using this relationship, we att mpted to pick out instances 
where a write to a file occurred and matched the program execution at that interval with 
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the file.   From Figure 25, we can see that the degree of accuracy at which our program 
behavior model identified read-write flow relationships between files is independent of 
the number of relationship links.  This result is rather surprising as we expected to see a 
growing degree of accuracy as more relationship link pairs are identified.  We 
hypothesize that this may be due to the large number of temporary files that certain 
editors such as vi create and delete as part of normal operation.  This behavior may have 
skewed the accuracy of files pairs with a low number of relationship links.  

























Figure 25.  Read-write relationship accuracy 
 
The previously discussed dominant features that are manifested in the journal due 
to the execution of a program are but one view of the information.  There also exist other 
files that are regularly accessed.  These files may not be as prominent as the dominant 
features, but are still telltale signs that a particular program may have been executed.  If 
files are accessed during the same period of time, there may be a relationship.  In 
addition, files which have close inode numbers may be related as they may be in the same 
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directory structure.  Here, it is difficult to derive a standard parameter to determine the 
closeness as every file system should be viewed as unique, but as the distance increases 
the probability of the files being related should decrease.  Therefore, a threshold is set 
that attempts to use the distance between inodes and the time values to establish a 








Host based program monitoring tools are an essential part of maintaining proper 
system integrity due to growing malicious network activity.  As systems become more 
complicated, the quantity of data collected by these tools ften grows beyond the ability 
of analysts to easily comprehend in a short amount of time.  In this section, we present a 
method for visual exploration of a system program flow over time to aid in the detection 
and identification of significant events.  This allows automatic accentuation of programs 
with irregular file access and child process propagation, which results in more efficient 
forensic analysis and system recovery times. 
The motivation of our research is to address the following points. 
• Visualization of program flow data gives the user a better overall view of 
system behavior. 
• Irregular events are more intuitively identifiable when presented visually. 
• Automatic accentuation of events lowers data analysis time and draws 
attention to trouble spots. 
• Taint propagation of process flows allows for rapid estima on of damage 
suffered following an intrusion. 
To achieve these goals, we first present our system call data as a flow diagram 
based on time.  As additional system processes spawn and files are accessed, each event 
is displayed at the time interval in which it occurred.  Over time, as repeated program 
executions and file accesses occur, a standard pattern for proper behavior emerges for the 
system.  During periods of irregular activity, new flow patterns may emerge and are 
brought to the attention of the user.  Finally, should any process or file become tainted, 
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we then propagate that taint through the flow diagram based on program and file access 
to show the extent of potential damage occurred on the syst m. 
7.1 Tools 
Prefuse - Prefuse [45] is a software framework written in Java to aid developers in 
the creation of information visualization applications.  The goal of Prefuse is to greatly 
simplify the process of data handling and representation.  The reason we chose Prefuse 
over other visualization toolkits such as Piccolo, Dot, and the Visualization Toolkit is its 
flexibility, the ability to render large amounts of data in an efficient manner, and 
excellent documentation.   
7.2 Approach 
Our approach to program flow visualization can be broken down into three stages: 
data acquisition and storage, analysis, and visualization.  It is not necessary that these 
operations be performed in the order listed.  In fact, further data analysis may be 
performed based on user input from examining the resulting visualization.  Finally, only 
the data acquisition and storage aspects must be performed in r al time on the target 
system to be monitored.  The analysis and visualization aspects can be performed 
elsewhere.  The data used in this section was collected using our method of modifying 
and gathering specific system call data targeting that of process execution and file usage.  
In order to present our data visually, we must first process the raw data obtained from 
system call monitoring.  This is achieved through the creation of several databases 
containing subsets of the logged information.  The first such database contains the 
program-file relationships.  This database contains the file usage of programs during 
execution, as seen by sys_open.  Our goal for creating this database is to identify the key 
library files used by the program for execution.  The second database we create using the 
system call data is a time ordered database which shows the order in which a program 
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accesses its library files.  Generally, each program accesses files in a predefined manner 
at predictable intervals between each access.  Using the program-file relationship 
database and the time ordered database, we are thus able to obtain a general idea of 
proper program execution behavior.  A third database, containig the list of sensitive 
system files (such as /etc/passwd), is also generated for modification detection and 
accentuation in the visualization phase. 
As previously discussed, one of the goals of visually representing the program 
flow is to provide a better overall view of the entire system.  To achieve this goal, we 
chose to visually represent our data in the following way: 
Each PID is a node in the flow diagram; child PIDs and accessed files are children 
of that node. 
The flow diagram is time ordered using the available time stamp of each logged 
operation.  Due to the fine-grained time unit used by Linux (1-10 seconds per step), we 
chose to categorize every event that occurs in a certain time period as concurrent.  The 
way this is chosen is user defined.  For example, the user may chose that all events that 
occurred within the same second be treated as concurrent, or perhaps all events that 
occurred within the same millisecond.  The length and scope of the tree will be 
determined by this user input. 
The diagram is collapsible at each node and the tree is in collapsed mode by 
default.  As the user clicks on each node, it renders itself into a sub-tree consisting of 
child processes and accessed files.  The files identified as library files under the program-
file relationship database are displayed as a single collapsed cluster.  A search option is 
also provided for the user to quickly locate a particular PID or file within the tree.  Figure 









For our research, we chose to target program-file accss behavior for automatic 
accentuation.  Using the program-file relationship database, we can identify the necessary 
library and support files required by each program for execution.  These files are then 
displayed as a cluster on our overall visualization.  Should any particular program access 
a different library file or one that is not in the order specified as by the time ordered 
database, then this program will be expanded and brought to the attention of the user.  
Also, any program that modifies a declared sensitive file will also be noted for further 
investigation. 
Our goal for propagation is to judge the extent of influence that any particular file 
or process has on the entire system.  This is also a way for the user to quickly estimate the 
extent of damage caused by an intrusion should a file or program be later determined as 
Figure 26. Visualization concept 
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malicious.  Once a specific PID or file has been marked on the tree as being tainted, 
propagation takes places using the algorithm in figure 27.  
 
Figure 27. Propagation Algorithm 
 
This algorithm begins by popping the top item for processing.  If the object is a 
file, then any process that has modified the file as well as any process that has read from 
the file will be pushed onto the queue.  If the object is a process, three checks are made.  
First, if the process has modified any tainted files, then any file modified by the program 
that is not marked as tainted is added to the queue.  Second, any parent process that has 
modified the current process will be added to the queue.  Third, any child processes 
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created by this process is added to the queue.  This algorithm terminates under two 
conditions, if the queue is empty, and if the distance to origin value has been exceeded. 
To terminate this propagation, we use a value called distance o origin.  This value 
is specified by the user and is defined as the number of links between the current object 
to the original marked source.  For example, the process that directly modified the 
marked tainted file is considered to have a distance of 1.  The parent process or the files 
modified by that marked process have a distance value of 2.  Once this distance value 
grows beyond a limit, then the current examined item is dropped from the queue. 
7.3 Results 
For our experiment, we obtained the data from a modified 2.6.20 kernel running 
Ubuntu Linux.  During the monitoring process, we executed several common programs, 
such as Firefox, gedit, cp, and cat, and several Linux virses. 
Figure 28 shows our process tree on the left and a view of the same tree zoomed 
in on a particular file on the right.  When an object is selected by clicking on an object 
name, it will be highlighted as light green.  All parent nodes within the tree are displayed 






Figure 28. Process Tree 
 
 
Figure 29 shows our selection of the “/usr/lib/locale/en_US.utf8/LC” file package 
(a commonly used set of files) and the subsequent accentuatio  of all such packages on 
the process tree.  Using file package selection quickly allows users to identify when and 
where programs perform actions on those files, such as re ding or modifying.  
Highlighting file packages also allows users to identify programs that may not have been 








Figure 30 shows the results of marking a file as tainted and propagating the results 
through the process tree.  Everything marked as red is at risk fo  potential infection, and a 
system restore must insure that every file marked thusly is examined.  Further 
improvements to the taint propagation algorithm can trim down the number of files to be 






Figure 29. File package highlighting 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have presented methods to monitor encrypted programs to allow their 
execution yet preserving the security of the system.  Specifically, we have focused on 
implementing on-demand system call monitoring for developing user trust in black-box 
programs.  A black-box program inherently does not start with a high level trust due to its 
multi-layer encryption along with unpredictable behavior.  By implementing system call 
monitoring and a behavior and policy based intrusion detection system, it is possible for 
users to execute such software while safe with the knowledge that their sensitive 
information remains secure. 
We believe that integrating the monitoring aspect directly into the system calls 
makes it significantly more difficult for a program to disable security or compromise a 
syetm without being detected.  The trust building system with program policies is flexible 
enough to allow program execution yet can proactively prevent s nsitive information 
from being accessed without user permission.  Using this method, we have successfully 
monitored an encrypted program, detected when a program was exploited, and tracked 
the activities of several viruses on the system.  
The data obtained through program monitoring contains a wealth of additional 
information that was not supplied by previous methods of system call tracing.  Using the 
data gathered, we have demonstrated the ability to forensically reconstruct prior system 
behavior based on the file system journal in case the system call monitoring becomes 
inactive or is disabled.  We have also shown the ability to obtain more detailed program 
signatures based on file access and time based dependencies a d collected several new 
behavior signatures that can be used to uniquely identify the program. 
Finally, as a part of our data presentation, we have introduced a method to 
visually represent the data gathered with system call monitoring in an intuitive manner.  
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This visual representation allows the user to quickly identify executions of programs on 
the process tree, isolate programs that access certain files, and to propagate the effects of 
a tainted program or file for an initial estimate of the extent of damage on the system.   
Currently, there are not many encryption tools and programs that operate on the 
Linux operating system due to lack of demand.  However, we feel that the general 
principle and technique behind our approach remains the same with our without 
encryption in place.  Our reasoning behind this argument is that no matter what type of 
program is being executed, its interactions with the system must pass through the system 
calls and thus will be under the scrutiny of our monitoring system.  Since trust 
development and intrusion detection is designed to be successful no matter what type of 
program is being executed on the system, we feel that detection of anomalous behavior of 
programs by our system is possible regardless of the encryption strength of these 
programs. 
8.1 Future Work 
Based on our work in building a system for monitoring encrypted programs, we 
have identified several areas of future research.   
8.1.1 System call security 
In our current work, we have not examined the countermeasurs available to 
defeat replacement of system calls or system call tables by an attacker.  Although it is 
possible for our monitoring system to detect this action taking place, once the system 
calls are compromised, all further data collection willstop. 
8.1.2 Automatic Policy Generation 
We have not investigated any method of automatically generati g  policy that 
provides the lowest number of system calls required for successful program execution.  
Currently, the system will simply log the addition of the policy to the program policy list 
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unless the policy to be included requires user permission.  A method for the automatic 
population of the policy list before program execution can be examined. 
8.1.3 Machine Learning for Program Behavior Database 
In our work presented in our publication [2], we discussed the possibility of using 
machine learning to assist in the creating and identification of program behaviors based 
on gathered system call data.  Further research should be conducted on machine learning. 
8.1.4 Performance Optimizations 
In addition to system integration, there are many ways to optimize our work.  This 
work was deliberately proof of concept only, thus a study of optimization issues would be 
beneficial. 
8.1.5 Better Visual Presentation 
Currently, our visualization representation is not an optimal approach as the large 
amounts of data make it difficult for users to examine.  Better visual representations or 
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APPENDIX A – LINUX SYSTEM CALLS 
   1  ENTRY(sys_call_table) 
   2        .long sys_restart_syscall       /* 0 - old "setup()" system call, used for restarting */ 
   3        .long sys_exit 
   4        .long sys_fork 
   5        .long sys_read 
   6        .long sys_write 
   7        .long sys_open          /* 5 */ 
   8        .long sys_close 
   9        .long sys_waitpid 
  10        .long sys_creat 
  11        .long sys_link 
  12        .long sys_unlink        /* 10 */ 
  13        .long sys_execve 
  14        .long sys_chdir 
  15        .long sys_time 
  16        .long sys_mknod 
  17        .long sys_chmod         /* 15 */ 
  18        .long sys_lchown16 
  19        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old break syscall holder */ 
  20        .long sys_stat 
  21        .long sys_lseek 
  22        .long sys_getpid        /* 20 */ 
  23        .long sys_mount 
  24        .long sys_oldumount 
  25        .long sys_setuid16 
  26        .long sys_getuid16 
  27        .long sys_stime         /* 25 */ 
  28        .long sys_ptrace 
  29        .long sys_alarm 
  30        .long sys_fstat 
  31        .long sys_pause 
  32        .long sys_utime         /* 30 */ 
  33        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old stty syscall hoder */ 
  34        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old gtty syscall holder */ 
  35        .long sys_access 
  36        .long sys_nice 
  37        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* 35 - old ftime syscall ho der */ 
  38        .long sys_sync 
  39        .long sys_kill 
  40        .long sys_rename 
  41        .long sys_mkdir 
  42        .long sys_rmdir         /* 40 */ 
  43        .long sys_dup 
  44        .long sys_pipe 
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  45        .long sys_times 
  46        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old prof syscall hoder */ 
  47        .long sys_brk           /* 45 */ 
  48        .long sys_setgid16 
  49        .long sys_getgid16 
  50        .long sys_signal 
  51        .long sys_geteuid16 
  52        .long sys_getegid16     /* 50 */ 
  53        .long sys_acct 
  54        .long sys_umount        /* recycled never used phys() */ 
  55        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old lock syscall holder */ 
  56        .long sys_ioctl 
  57        .long sys_fcntl         /* 55 */ 
  58        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old mpx syscall hoder */ 
  59        .long sys_setpgid 
  60        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old ulimit syscall holder */ 
  61        .long sys_olduname 
  62        .long sys_umask         /* 60 */ 
  63        .long sys_chroot 
  64        .long sys_ustat 
  65        .long sys_dup2 
  66        .long sys_getppid 
  67        .long sys_getpgrp       /* 65 */ 
  68        .long sys_setsid 
  69        .long sys_sigaction 
  70        .long sys_sgetmask 
  71        .long sys_ssetmask 
  72        .long sys_setreuid16    /* 70 */ 
  73        .long sys_setregid16 
  74        .long sys_sigsuspend 
  75        .long sys_sigpending 
  76        .long sys_sethostname 
  77        .long sys_setrlimit     /* 75 */ 
  78        .long sys_old_getrlimit 
  79        .long sys_getrusage 
  80        .long sys_gettimeofday 
  81        .long sys_settimeofday 
  82        .long sys_getgroups16   /* 80 */ 
  83        .long sys_setgroups16 
  84        .long old_select 
  85        .long sys_symlink 
  86        .long sys_lstat 
  87        .long sys_readlink      /* 85 */ 
  88        .long sys_uselib 
  89        .long sys_swapon 
  90        .long sys_reboot 
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  91        .long old_readdir 
  92        .long old_mmap          /* 90 */ 
  93        .long sys_munmap 
  94        .long sys_truncate 
  95        .long sys_ftruncate 
  96        .long sys_fchmod 
  97        .long sys_fchown16      /* 95 */ 
  98        .long sys_getpriority 
  99        .long sys_setpriority 
 100        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old profil syscall ho der */ 
 101        .long sys_statfs 
 102        .long sys_fstatfs       /* 100 */ 
 103        .long sys_ioperm 
 104        .long sys_socketcall 
Sub-function system calls 
#define SYS_SOCKET      1             /* sys_socket(2)             */ 
#define SYS_BIND            2            /* sys_bind(2)             */ 
#define SYS_CONNECT   3            /* sys_connect(2)            */ 
#define SYS_LISTEN        4            /* sys_listen(2)             */ 
#define SYS_ACCEPT      5              /* sys_accept(2)                */ 
#define SYS_GETSOCKNAME 6    /* sys_getsockname(2)           */ 
#define SYS_GETPEERNAME 7             /* sys_getpeername(2)           */ 
#define SYS_SOCKETPAIR  8               /* sys_socketpair(2)            */ 
#define SYS_SEND        9               /* sys_send(2)                  */ 
#define SYS_RECV        10              /* sys_recv(2)            */ 
#define SYS_SENDTO      11              /* sys_sendto(2)            */ 
#define SYS_RECVFROM    12              /* sys_recvfrom(2)            */ 
#define SYS_SHUTDOWN    13              /* sys_shutdown(2)            */ 
#define SYS_SETSOCKOPT  14              /* sys_setsockopt(2)            */ 
#define SYS_GETSOCKOPT  15              /* sys_getsockopt(2)            */ 
#define SYS_SENDMSG     16              /* sys_sendmsg(2)              */ 
#define SYS_RECVMSG     17              /* sys_recvmsg(2)          */ 
 105        .long sys_syslog 
 106        .long sys_setitimer 
 107        .long sys_getitimer     /* 105 */ 
 108        .long sys_newstat 
 109        .long sys_newlstat 
 110        .long sys_newfstat 
 111        .long sys_uname 
 112        .long sys_iopl          /* 110 */ 
 113        .long sys_vhangup 
 114        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old "idle" system call */ 
 115        .long sys_vm86old 
 116        .long sys_wait4 
 117        .long sys_swapoff       /* 115 */ 
 118        .long sys_sysinfo 
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 119        .long sys_ipc 
 120        .long sys_fsync 
 121        .long sys_sigreturn 
 122        .long sys_clone         /* 120 */ 
 123        .long sys_setdomainname 
 124        .long sys_newuname 
 125        .long sys_modify_ldt 
 126        .long sys_adjtimex 
 127        .long sys_mprotect      /* 125 */ 
 128        .long sys_sigprocmask 
 129        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* old "create_module" */ 
 130        .long sys_init_module 
 131        .long sys_delete_module 
 132        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* 130: old "get_kernel_syms" */ 
 133        .long sys_quotactl 
 134        .long sys_getpgid 
 135        .long sys_fchdir 
 136        .long sys_bdflush 
 137        .long sys_sysfs         /* 135 */ 
 138        .long sys_personality 
 139        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* reserved for afs_syscall */ 
 140        .long sys_setfsuid16 
 141        .long sys_setfsgid16 
 142        .long sys_llseek        /* 140 */ 
 143        .long sys_getdents 
 144        .long sys_select 
 145        .long sys_flock 
 146        .long sys_msync 
 147        .long sys_readv         /* 145 */ 
 148        .long sys_writev 
 149        .long sys_getsid 
 150        .long sys_fdatasync 
 151        .long sys_sysctl 
 152        .long sys_mlock         /* 150 */ 
 153        .long sys_munlock 
 154        .long sys_mlockall 
 155        .long sys_munlockall 
 156        .long sys_sched_setparam 
 157        .long sys_sched_getparam   /* 155 */ 
 158        .long sys_sched_setscheduler 
 159        .long sys_sched_getscheduler 
 160        .long sys_sched_yield 
 161        .long sys_sched_get_priority_max 
 162        .long sys_sched_get_priority_min  /* 160 */ 
 163        .long sys_sched_rr_get_interval 
 164        .long sys_nanosleep 
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 165        .long sys_mremap 
 166        .long sys_setresuid16 
 167        .long sys_getresuid16   /* 165 */ 
 168        .long sys_vm86 
 169        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* Old sys_query_module */ 
 170        .long sys_poll 
 171        .long sys_nfsservctl 
 172        .long sys_setresgid16   /* 170 */ 
 173        .long sys_getresgid16 
 174        .long sys_prctl 
 175        .long sys_rt_sigreturn 
 176        .long sys_rt_sigaction 
 177        .long sys_rt_sigprocmask        /* 175 */ 
 178        .long sys_rt_sigpending 
 179        .long sys_rt_sigtimedwait 
 180        .long sys_rt_sigqueueinfo 
 181        .long sys_rt_sigsuspend 
 182        .long sys_pread64       /* 180 */ 
 183        .long sys_pwrite64 
 184        .long sys_chown16 
 185        .long sys_getcwd 
 186        .long sys_capget 
 187        .long sys_capset        /* 185 */ 
 188        .long sys_sigaltstack 
 189        .long sys_sendfile 
 190        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* reserved for streams1 */ 
 191        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* reserved for streams2 */ 
 192        .long sys_vfork         /* 190 */ 
 193        .long sys_getrlimit 
 194        .long sys_mmap2 
 195        .long sys_truncate64 
 196        .long sys_ftruncate64 
 197        .long sys_stat64        /* 195 */ 
 198        .long sys_lstat64 
 199        .long sys_fstat64 
 200        .long sys_lchown 
 201        .long sys_getuid 
 202        .long sys_getgid        /* 200 */ 
 203        .long sys_geteuid 
 204        .long sys_getegid 
 205        .long sys_setreuid 
 206        .long sys_setregid 
 207        .long sys_getgroups     /* 205 */ 
 208        .long sys_setgroups 
 209        .long sys_fchown 
 210        .long sys_setresuid 
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 211        .long sys_getresuid 
 212        .long sys_setresgid     /* 210 */ 
 213        .long sys_getresgid 
 214        .long sys_chown 
 215        .long sys_setuid 
 216        .long sys_setgid 
 217        .long sys_setfsuid      /* 215 */ 
 218        .long sys_setfsgid 
 219        .long sys_pivot_root 
 220        .long sys_mincore 
 221        .long sys_madvise 
 222        .long sys_getdents64    /* 220 */ 
 223        .long sys_fcntl64 
 224        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* reserved for TUX */ 
 225        .long sys_ni_syscall 
 226        .long sys_gettid 
 227        .long sys_readahead     /* 225 */ 
 228        .long sys_setxattr 
 229        .long sys_lsetxattr 
 230        .long sys_fsetxattr 
 231        .long sys_getxattr 
 232        .long sys_lgetxattr     /* 230 */ 
 233        .long sys_fgetxattr 
 234        .long sys_listxattr 
 235        .long sys_llistxattr 
 236        .long sys_flistxattr 
 237        .long sys_removexattr   /* 235 */ 
 238        .long sys_lremovexattr 
 239        .long sys_fremovexattr 
 240        .long sys_tkill 
 241        .long sys_sendfile64 
 242        .long sys_futex         /* 240 */ 
 243        .long sys_sched_setaffinity 
 244        .long sys_sched_getaffinity 
 245        .long sys_set_thread_area 
 246        .long sys_get_thread_area 
 247        .long sys_io_setup      /* 245 */ 
 248        .long sys_io_destroy 
 249        .long sys_io_getevents 
 250        .long sys_io_submit 
 251        .long sys_io_cancel 
 252        .long sys_fadvise64     /* 250 */ 
 253        .long sys_ni_syscall 
 254        .long sys_exit_group 
 255        .long sys_lookup_dcookie 
 256        .long sys_epoll_create 
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 257        .long sys_epoll_ctl     /* 255 */ 
 258        .long sys_epoll_wait 
 259        .long sys_remap_file_pages 
 260        .long sys_set_tid_address 
 261        .long sys_timer_create 
 262        .long sys_timer_settime         /* 260 */ 
 263        .long sys_timer_gettime 
 264        .long sys_timer_getoverrun 
 265        .long sys_timer_delete 
 266        .long sys_clock_settime 
 267        .long sys_clock_gettime         /* 265 */ 
 268        .long sys_clock_getres 
 269        .long sys_clock_nanosleep 
 270        .long sys_statfs64 
 271        .long sys_fstatfs64 
 272        .long sys_tgkill        /* 270 */ 
 273        .long sys_utimes 
 274        .long sys_fadvise64_64 
 275        .long sys_ni_syscall    /* sys_vserver */ 
 276        .long sys_mbind 
 277        .long sys_get_mempolicy 
 278        .long sys_set_mempolicy 
 279        .long sys_mq_open 
 280        .long sys_mq_unlink 
 281        .long sys_mq_timedsend 
 282        .long sys_mq_timedreceive       /* 280 */ 
 283        .long sys_mq_notify 
 284        .long sys_mq_getsetattr 
 285        .long sys_kexec_load 
 286        .long sys_waitid 
 287        .long sys_ni_syscall            /* 285 */ /* available */ 
 288        .long sys_add_key 
 289        .long sys_request_key 
 290        .long sys_keyctl 
 291        .long sys_ioprio_set 
 292        .long sys_ioprio_get            /* 290 */ 
 293        .long sys_inotify_init 
 294        .long sys_inotify_add_watch 
 295        .long sys_inotify_rm_watch 
 296        .long sys_migrate_pages 
 297        .long sys_openat                /* 295 */ 
 298        .long sys_mkdirat 
 299        .long sys_mknodat 
 300        .long sys_fchownat 
 301        .long sys_futimesat 
 302        .long sys_fstatat64             /* 300 */ 
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 303        .long sys_unlinkat 
 304        .long sys_renameat 
 305        .long sys_linkat 
 306        .long sys_symlinkat 
 307        .long sys_readlinkat            /* 305 */ 
 308        .long sys_fchmodat 
 309        .long sys_faccessat 
 310        .long sys_pselect6 
 311        .long sys_ppoll 
 312        .long sys_unshare               /* 310 */ 
 313        .long sys_set_robust_list 
 314        .long sys_get_robust_list 
 315        .long sys_splice 
 316        .long sys_sync_file_range 
 317        .long sys_tee                   /* 315 */ 
 318        .long sys_vmsplice 
 319        .long sys_move_pages 
 320        .long sys_getcpu 
 321        .long sys_epoll_pwait 
 322        .long sys_utimensat             /* 320 */ 
 323        .long sys_signalfd 
 324        .long sys_timerfd 
 325        .long sys_eventfd 
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